RTU

DNP3 Vulnerabilities Part 2 of 2 – Why DPI Firewalls Might be Industry’s Only Hope

In last week’s Practical SCADA Security blog, I discussed how the new vulnerabilities discovered in DNP3 SCADA masters are carving big holes in the NERC’s concept of the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP).

DNP3 Vulnerabilities Part 1 of 2 - NERC’s Electronic Security Perimeter is Swiss Cheese

If you have been following SCADA news in the last month, you might have noticed an avalanche of reports and blogs on new security vulnerabilities in power industry equipment. So far, vulnerability disclosures for 9 products using the DNP3 protocol have been released by the ICS-CERT, with another 21 SCADA product disclosures on their way.

SCADA Security Basics: SCADA vs. ICS Terminology

Recently I saw a posting on LinkedIn asking “What’s the difference between a SCADA system and an ICS system, and if there is no difference, then why do we have two different names?”

This is a good question, because unless you have worked in the industrial automation field for a few decades, the terminology can seem very confusing. Not only do we have SCADA versus ICS, we also have terms like Process Control, Discrete Control, Industrial Automation, Manufacturing Automation Systems, Distributed Control Systems, Energy Management Systems and so on.

PLC Security Risk: Controller Operating Systems

Recently I was asked “How could a hacker possibly attack an industrial controller like a PLC or SIS, since there is no operating system in these devices?”

Now some manufacturers would like people to believe there is no operating system in a controller, but unfortunately this is not true. Every RTU, PLC, SIS or DCS controller on the market today has a commercial operating system in it. For example, here are just a few I have worked directly with in the past:

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