Submitted by Eric Byres on Fri, 2010-11-26 13:50
Over the past two weeks, there has been considerable progress in determining exactly what industrial process Stuxnet’s creators were trying to destroy. This news is not good for the industrial control system and SCADA communities.
First the Symantec team announced that one of Stuxnet’s payloads was designed to change the output frequencies of specific Variable Frequency Drives (VFDs) and thus the speed of the motors connected to them, essentially sabotaging the industrial process.
Submitted by Eric Byres on Fri, 2010-10-01 12:26
I have just come back from three very interesting presentations by Symantec, Microsoft and Kaspersky Labs at the Virus Bulletin 2010 conference. For two hours they discussed their latest findings on Stuxnet, the PLC/SCADA-targeting worm of the decade.
Submitted by Eric Byres on Thu, 2010-09-23 10:07
Week after week, the Stuxnet worm continues to amuse and astound all of us that have studied it. Last week it was Ralph Langner’s detailed analysis that showed Stuxnet wasn’t just infecting Windows boxes and stealing data, it was specifically designed to modify PLC logic so it could destroy a physical process. Next it is the amazing number of Windows zero-day vulnerabilities* it exploits to do its dirty work.
Submitted by Eric Byres on Fri, 2010-09-17 09:16
Back in July when Stuxnet first became public, I wrote in our Siemens PCS7 WinCC Malware White Paper and told anyone that would listen that Stuxnet was targeted at stealing intellectual property from process systems. The code we analyzed showed Stuxnet performing SQL database accesses and process information uploading to servers in Denmark and Malaysia, so this seemed like a sure answer.