Submitted by Eric Byres on Thu, 2012-11-08 10:28
Who is responsible for fixing the thousands (some say 100,000) of vulnerabilities that exist in PLCs, DCS, RTUs and other automation devices that are in use in facilities around the world?
On the one hand, we have the position of Dale Peterson at Digital Bond. Dale ardently argues for (and takes) aggressive measures to pressure ICS vendors into making their products more secure. Through their 2012 Project Basecamp and subsequent disclosures, Digital Bond publically released vulnerability details for a large number of controllers.
Submitted by Eric Byres on Tue, 2012-11-06 11:12
In last week's blog, Heather wrote an excellent summary of Mark Cooksley's network security presentation regarding "Why Industrial Networks are Different than IT Networks". In it she noted that the number one goal of ICS security is based on the concern for safety. This is spot-on in my opinion. However, there is more to consider when it comes to industrial security priorities…
Submitted by Heather MacKenzie on Wed, 2012-10-31 14:07
Previously we looked at the question of “Why are PLCs so insecure?” Today we are going to come at SCADA security from another angle, which is “Why is securing Industrial Networks different than securing IT Networks?” We will also look at three ways to address these differences.
